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Date 4 JAN 91 HRP 89-2

EXAMPLE OF HOW A HANDBOOK ON ESTIMATES MIGHT OPEN

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distributed to
~~CIA~~ estimates are written for:

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HRP 89-2

The President of the United States

The Secretary of State

Etc.

the handbook of the
Whether or not ~~all or any of these people~~ read any or all reports is

generally unknown to CIA and in any case is beside the point. Because they constitute the distribution list, and since they make up the bulk of those who must have good intelligence in order to provide for the security of the country, it should be assumed by CIA that they personally read its estimates. To assume otherwise, would be to undervalue the estimates and thus to tend to vitiate them.

If top-level readers are to be the ~~sole~~ target of estimates, it is necessary to consider what sort of presentation best suits their needs. From all that can be gathered, something like the following can be assumed regarding this problem:

1. The Readers are extremely busy people and either cannot or believe they cannot read ~~ext~~ extended studies, however important the matter

21

covered. For this reason, they are partial to summaries as has been shown constantly in their comments and requests. It can be inferred that a reader who insists on a summary will be unlikely to read anything beyond the summary unless ~~it is~~ what follows is itself very brief or concerns matters of exceptional importance to the ^{him} ~~individual~~ reader. From the considerations above have arisen not only the invariable inclusion of summaries in CIA reports, but the tendency to treat subjects in a way that many find illogical, with conclusions and forecasts given first instead of last where one would normally expect them. This reverse order likewise reflects the desires of people who can usually not afford to read beyond the minimum they must know.

2. These people are in general interested in the conclusions reached by CIA, not the processes by which those conclusions were reached. They furthermore---unlike many readers of similar studies published in other connections---do not demand all the evidence which supports the conclusions.

They are entitled to assume that, because all evidence available to the ^{ambassadors of the IAC are required to be} Government is available to CIA, and since CIA analysts are the best available in the United States, conclusions reached in the papers will either be true or at least as near the truth as it is possible for the Government to get,

22
at ~~this time~~^{if}. Should CIA conclusions prove consistently wrong, it is to be

assumed that the Readers, rather than beginning to call for supporting

on processes of reasoning
evidence, would---speaking mildly---take steps to reorganize CIA. Readers

furthermore, must assume that behind the conclusions reached by ~~CIA~~ are all

the supporting facts, and that these facts could be made available at any time.*

~~xx~~ The participation of the IAC agencies in the process of pre-

paring CIA reports, though established by NSC directive, is ^{an} incidental

rather than an essential feature of production. Though CIA may hope for

Agency concurrence and deplore substantial dissent, it ^{should} ~~should~~ not become a

major effort to avoid the latter. Dissents can occur only when CIA believes

itself right. In such a case, a contrary opinion, while interesting, is hardly

devastating. The dissent merely serves one of the purposes of coordination:

(CIA's substitution) (agencies)
to allow ~~each~~ intelligence agency an opportunity to state divergent views

^{they} if ~~it~~ so wishes. Whether or not the presence of dissents will incline Readers

to doubt CIA estimates will depend^{primarily}, not on the frequency of ~~of~~ Agency

non-concurrence but on how often CIA proves to be wrong.

It should be emphasized in this connection that NSC directives complete^{el}

Agency

Agency

*Somewhat parallel case: the average reader of a newspaper looks at the weather report in the upper left hand corner of page 1, which is a pure conclusion; the exceptional reader, who happens to be interested in meteorology, looks at the map and discussion on page 50; one in a million might avail himself of ~~the~~ all supporting data which may be found in the Weather Bureau.)

I thought for this week

"It's far more important to tell a man that he's about to be hit by a falling brick, than to detail to him, as he lies bleeding on the sidewalk, the true significance of the manufacture of bricks, the operation of the law of gravity, and the relationship of that particular brick to the structure from which it fell."

Main elements of an Estimate:

1. Conclusions. These will not be stated as such (i.e. in a section trailing along the end marked "Conclusions") but should be drawn first, before the estimate is written. If an estimate is to be written, it is assumed that the Analyst has before him a mass of evidence in various forms which leads inescapably to conclusions which would be relevant to: (a) the formation of US policy; (b) ~~xxxxxx~~ a warning of dangerous impending events; (c) consequences arising from actions undertaken or not undertaken by the US or a foreign power; (d) analyses of situations which need to be clarified for a proper understanding of world events; (e) etc

The conclusions reached from the evidence, actually constitute the Estimate: ~~xxx~~ other material appearing in the written paper may be justified only because it supports the conclusions or serves to clarify them.

2. What constitutes an ORE. First, any subject required of CIA by competent authority (e.g. the NSC.) Such a subject automatically becomes an IM, an ORE, or both.

Otherwise, any subject which (a) comes under one of the headings in 1 above; (b) should definitely be brought to the attention of the President; (c) represents a problem capable of solution, either through action or change of policy.

Point (b) above will be questioned. It is believed, however, that since CIA was created primarily to furnish intelligence for the President of the United States, and since he ^{comes first} ~~is number one~~ of all important distribution lists, it would be a mistake to publish unless the paper, if he read it, would be of use to him. Whether or not he will read all or a part of any given ~~part~~ study must be conjectural, but it ^{should be assumed that he} ~~would be a mistake to assume anything else than that the President~~ ^{could} ~~would~~ read every word ~~of any given study~~ if for no other reason than that he might. Beyond that, however, ~~it is not logical to suppose that to aim~~ it is logical to suppose that to aim lower in intelligence production would ~~tend to lessen the quality~~ its quality.

Point (c) may be considered variable; yet in the last analysis, there is usually little use in sending ~~any~~ out a publication which states a problem about which nothing can be done. It is not, of course, the business of CIA to tell the Gov-